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CHALLENGE OF THE COMMON 
MARKET IN SOUTH AMERICA: 
REMA UNDER MERCOSUR 
By PEDRO VILLEGAS * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As trade integration continues to be a central feature of the 
contemporary Latin American economic metamorphosis, the 
extent to which trade liberalization and concerns for environ-
mental quality have been linked continues to vary across the 
Americas. In some cases, expeditious negotiation of inter-
American trade pacts have not been matched by equally ambi-
tious efforts to address long-standing and emerging environ-
mental dilemmas. In other cases, political commitments to 
safeguard and to improve environmental quality alongside 
freer trade have resulted in new internl:\tional institutional re-
sponses to environmental matters. Differences among domes-
tic political economies and international positioning may ex-
plain this uneven environmental policy development. For 
whatever reason, asymmetries among environmental policies 
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Program Administrator for the Pacific Council on International Policy's Haynes Pro-
gram on Southern California's Global Engagement. Mr. Villegas holds a B.A. in Gov-
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conceived in tandem with separate liberalization agreements in 
the Americas pose a variety of difficulties both for the physical 
state of the inter-American environment and for the political 
task of negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
The largest and most strategic inter-American trade pacts-
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR)-best illus-
trate the problem of environmental policy asymmetry for inter-
American trade integration. Some observers have promoted 
reconciliation of the two agreements as a possible avenue to-
ward a FTAA. The difficulties surrounding this approach, as 
Stephan Haggard, Director of the Institute for Global Conflict 
and Cooperation, rightly points out, are daunting: 
The NAFTA and the MERCOSUR are emerging as the 
two pivots of the hemispheric integration process .... 
However, it is also the case that the countries of the 
hemisphere continue to disagree on the scope, speed and 
structure cooperation should take ... Latin American 
initiatives reflect quite different policy preoccupations 
and have even been formulated in part as strategic 
counterweight to American influence .... The key to the 
hemispheric process rests on how the North American 
and South American complexes will be reconciled. 1 
Environmental policy is one of the often-overlooked "initia-
tives" where fundamental differences in policy pose a barrier to 
a FrAA. Deservedly, the environmental provisions of the 
NAFTA have commanded the majority of scholarly attention 
devoted to the issue of free trade and environmental quality in 
the Americas. 2 
Above all, the greatest contribution made by the NAFTA 
environmental side agreements appears to have been their un-
1. Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of Regionalism in the Western Hemi· 
sphere, 2·3 (May 1996) (research paper, Graduate School of International Relations 
and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, <http://www·irps.ucsd.edu>. 
2. See Richard Opper & Mark Spalding, Mexico &rder Environmental &gulation. 
in 1996 WILEY ENVIRONMENTAL LAw UPDATE (Stern & Volz eds., 1996); Mark Spalding, 
Lessons ofNAFI'Afor Apec, 6 J. ENV'T AND DEV. 2 (1997). 
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ambiguous insertion of the environment into inter-American 
integration policy debates~ebates often asphyxiated by my-
opic attention to commercial issues. The environmental poli-
cies of the NAFTA, linking trade and the environment through 
new environmental institutions, set the precedent for integra-
tion with NAFTA members. Put simply, the NAFTA set a 
standard for environmental policy that conditioned the land-
scape of future economic integration with Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada. 
Less attention has been paid to the MERCOSUR and its 
environmental policy components. Established by the Treaty of 
Asunci6n on March 26, 1991, MERCOSUR seeks a greater ex-
change of goods, services, and factors of production among its 
member nations-Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.3 
The agreement calls for the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies and sector policies as well as the harmonization of na-
tionallegislation with the goal of enhancing member countries' 
international market competitiveness. 4 
The Treaty of Asunci6n builds upon a process of integration 
between Argentina and Brazil begun in 1988 and as of January 
1, 1995, member countries have been operating under a com-
mon external tariff, the basis of new investment and trade pat-
terns in the Southern Cone region. 5 MERCOSUR has also 
forged partner agreements with Bolivia and Chile and is cur-
rently pursuing alliances with the Andean Pact and, sepa-
rately, with Venezuela.6 
Evident from the following analysis of MERCOSUR's envi-
ronmental provisions is the recognition that like other impor-
tant integration issues, the environmental dimension of MER-
COSUR economic integration is managed much differently 
than NAFTA's and even the European Union's, to which MER-
COSUR is more alike in organizational structure. While the 
3. Boletim de Integracao Latino-Americana (BILA) (visited April 5, 1999) 
<http://www.mre.gov.br/getecIWEBGETEClBlLAlLISTA.htm> [hereinafter BILAJ. 
4. Inter-American Development &nk (visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.iadb.org>. 
5. Id. . 
6. Members of the Andean Pact are Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Vene-
zuela. 
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NAFTA institutionalizes cooperation among its member coun-
tries, the MERCOSUR lacks institutional mechanisms for co-
ordinated environmental protection, despite rapidly expanding 
and new trade practices among its members. MERCOSUR 
countries share with the NAFTA countries similar environ-
mental challenges born from border development and sectoral 
adjustments within national economies. Yet, the MERCOSUR 
relies upon relatively weak policy coordination among separate 
national regulatory regimes to address the environmental costs 
of economic integration. The context of environmental policy in 
the MERCOSUR is quite different from the NAFTA context. 
More disparate domestic regulatory frameworks, limited insti-
tutional capacities, and North-South disagreements over envi-
ronment versus economic development are among a variety of 
factors that conspire in making Southern Cone environmental 
policies rudimentary. As Argentine commercial and environ-
mental lawyer Guillermo Malm Green notes, "the specific pro-
visions and regulations that NAFTA enforces are still merely 
declarations of principles in MERCOSUR, which yet need to be 
regulated.'" 
The preamble of the Treaty of Asunci6n states the guiding 
principle of the MERCOSUR environmental approach to be 
''preservation of the environment ... on the grounds of the prin-
ciples of graduality, flexibility, and equilibrium." From 1992 to 
1996, the Reunwn Especializada de Medio Ambiente (Special 
Meetings on Environment or REMA) constituted MERCO-
SUR's response to environmental issues. The REMA operated 
as a sort of task force commissioned by the Common Market 
Group (CMG}-MERCOSUR's executive body-for the purpose 
of exploring how best to harmonize national envil'Onmental 
legislations. The REMA, however, was not a part of MERCO-
SUR's formal structure, and not until 1996 was one of MER-
COSUR's ten Special Working Groups (SWGs) devoted to envi-
ronmental matters. Operating directly under the CMG, the 
SWG on Environment simply continued the work of the REMA 
on harmonization of national codes. 
7. Guillermo MaIm Green, Environmental Issues and MERCOSUR, in FREE TRADE 
AREA FOR THE AMERICAS 184 (Joseph A. McKinney & Melissa Essary eds., 1995). 
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MERCOSUR's environmental policy development according 
to the precepts of "graduality, flexibility, and equilibrium" has 
proven insufficient in light of Southern Cone environmental 
problems. Freer trade in the region has brought negative envi-
ronmental outcomes linked to large-scale infrastructure proj-
ects and to the intensification of export industries. The subse-
quent activism of environmentalists in MERCOSUR countries 
and abroad poses a significant political barrier to FTAA-par-
ticularly in the United States. This uneven development of 
trade and environmental policies is extending beyond MER-
COSUR, as recent negotiations to expand MERCOSUR trade to 
the Andean Community may proliferate weak environmental 
measures across South America.8 
Debates in the United States over granting "fast track" ne-
gotiating authority to President Clinton and Chilean accession 
to the NAFTA suggest that the long-term prospect for a FTAA 
built upon NAFTA-MERCOSUR integration is undermined by 
an emerging juxtaposition. At least partial policy mediation of 
environmental outcomes in the North contrasts against envi-
ronmental degradation unmitigated by nascent, even complai-
sant, environmental politics in the South. Polarizing environ-
mental practices between integration accords has the continen-
tal effect of strengthening politically critical environmental 
constituencies in the U.S. and of inviting recriminations by the 
Northern business community of unfair competitive advan-
tages accruing to MERCOSUR exporters under loose environ-
mental regimes. 
This article will fIrst discuss the type of cooperation that 
MERCOSUR provides for negotiation of trade and environ-
mental policies. Comparison with the NAFTA illustrates the 
limited range of MERCOSUR initiatives beyond trade policies 
and its defense within general inter-American development 
debates. Second, the article offers a profile of current Southern 
Cone environmental challenges. Third, the article lays out 
MERCOSUR's environmental policies and the paucity of prog-
8. See British Broadcasting Corporation, Andean Summit Final Document Stresses 
Need for Further Integration, Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 April 1997 available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws me. 
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ress made in adequately addressing those environmental chal-
lenges. 
II. THE NAFTA AND THE MERCOSUR: INTEGRATION 
VERSUS COOPERATION 
The MERCOSUR and the NAFTA are distinct types of re-
gional agreements that reflect unique histories, national politi-
cal economies and member country's diplomatic relations. In-
ternal national politics and international power dynamics 
among member countries specifically inform. the degree and 
kind of cooperation under each pact. Several analyses of mod-
ern integration efforts observe these structural differences be-
tween the NAFrAand the MERCOSUR. Peter Smith, Director 
of the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, notes 
significant differences in scope, depth, institutionalization and 
centralization between the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR--the 
latter arguably falling short of his integration criteria on envi-
ronmental matters: 
Integration is not the same as intergovernmental coop-
eration .... Integration entails the creation of a new en-
tity ... that provides a recognized framework for ac-
commodation among member states on issues relating 
to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital or 
persons. Integration thus provides information, estab-
lishes common expectations, and assures a level of pre-
dictability. Intergovernmental cooperation, on the other 
hand, results from ad hoc bargaining between sovereign 
states; it does not necessarily occur within a framework 
of long-term expectations, convergent interests, and 
shared benefits. 9 
In codifying Smith's observation, the typology of integration 
has been described as consisting of four gradations ranging 
from comprehensive political, economic and social integration 
9. PETER SMITH, THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS. 5-
10 (Peter Smith ed., 1993). 
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(Type I) to simple cooperation pacts (Type 1V).10 In both 
schemes, the NAFTA rates as a much more comprehensive, 
cooperative and binding agreement than the MERCOSUR. 
The environmental institutions of the NAFTA demonstrate 
more sophistication and intent than the loose, cooperative ori-
entation of the MERCOSUR. In the case of the NAFTA, U.S. 
domestic political accountability to environmental groups (and 
allied, opportunistic political bedfellows) and historical rela-
tionships among the signatory countries produced a regime 
consisting of dispute resolution and border environment insti-
tutions. The United States and Canada had established official 
rapport on border environmental issues (transborder smelter 
contamination) dating to the first half of the century. In the 
latter half of the 1980s, Mexico's economic liberalization pro-
gram opened avenues for renewed and closer cooperation with 
the United States-cooperation that lead to the NAFrA and 
negotiation of new environmental institutions. These institu-
tions embody supranational characteristics and address a spec-
trum of outstanding and anticipated North American environ-
mental issues. 
In the case of the MERCOSUR, the tenuous relationships 
between signatory countries and the relative weakness of pub-
lic influence on policymaking partially account for the pact's 
initial exclusion of environmental concerns and, later, for the 
past's belated, perfunctory and compartmentalized treatment 
of environmental iss':les. MERCOSUR's exceedingly cautious 
and slow approach to environmental issues might also reflect 
historically contentious member countries' diplomatic relations. 
In the 1970s, MERCOSUR countries were governed militarily 
and some approached war with each other over water rights to 
the Parana River.ll Member countries have reasonable histori-
cal reasons to be averse to any overarching authority on eco-
10. Manfred Mols, &gional Integration and the International System, in Coop-
ERATION OR RIVALRY: REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS AND THE PACIFIC RIM 
15-24 (Nishijima & Smith eds., 1996). 
11. See Diana Tussie & Patricia 1. Vasquez, The FTAA, MERCOSUR, and the En-
vironment, Presentation at the Trade and the Environment in the Americas Confer-
ence 7-9 (University of California, Los Angeles, April 11, 1997). 
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nomic or other matters. As in macroeconomic policy, according 
to Argentina's former secretary for MERCOSUR, Felix Peiia, 
the pact has severe difficulties advancing beyond "a minimum 
consensus on economic fundamentals."12 The MERCOSUR 
consensus is a frail and extremely flexible consensus, thus con-
straining the scope and the depth of its policies-environment 
included-in the Southern Cone. Over twenty years, however, 
the necessity of economic growth through improved trade 
slowly eroded lingering diplomatic suspicions. 
The weakness of MERCOSUR environmental policies has 
more practical roots as well. Contradictions between Brazilian 
and Argentine economic policies require that commitments to 
MERCOSUR be flexible in order to accommodate domestic po-
litical economies. 13 Brazilian economist Gilson Swartz posits 
the tentativeness of MERCOSUR coordination even on its prin-
cipal objective, trade liberalization: 
after the Mexican crisis, when Argentina came close to 
default on its foreign obligations and Brazil faced a 
speculative attack on its new currency ... [b]oth gov-
ernments reacted with raising import tariffs and nego-
tiating of wider exception lists and new, more flexible 
schedules for MERCOSUR common external tal·iffs. In 
short, pragmatism won out over any sort of ideological 
or utopian integration ideal. 14 
This notion has been seconded: "Pragmatism seems to be 
the essence behind the functioning of MERCOSUR. Agile deci-
12. Felix Pena, Strategies for Macroeconomic Coordination: Reflections on the Case 
of MERCOSUR, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS, 
supra note 9, at 184. 
13. Interestingly, recent swings in trade flows between Argentina and Brazil have 
revealed a strikingly weakness in MERCOSUR cooperation in the area of exchange 
rate management (an area where Argentina's currency board imposes strict limits on 
cooperation). Following a strong aversion to things supranational, Brazil resorted to 
negotiated ad hoc unilateral import controls on automobiles, for example, to counter an 
unfavorable shift in its terms of trade with Argentina. 
14. Gilson Schwartz, Brazil, MERCOSUR, and SAFI'A: DestructilJe Restructuring 
or Pan·American Integration?, in COOPERATION OR RIVALRY: REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN 
THE AMERICAS AND THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 10. 
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sion-making and no supranational institutions are the core 
elements behind its obvious flexibility."15 
The member countries of MERCOSUR have been reluctant 
to incorporate stringent environmental policies for an addi-
tional, generalized reason that echoes traditional North-South 
debates on development. "Some government sectors still be-
lieve that such [environmental] legislation should not hinder 
the economic development process."16 Brazil, in particular, has 
been quick to point out the role of over-consumption in the de-
veloped countries of the North. Environmental degradation in 
Latin American countries is fundamentally linked to practices 
and excessive demand in rich countries. The effects of exces-
sive hydrocarbon use by Northern industrialized countries on 
the Amazon rainforest are a favorite example. Pressures from 
the developed world for stronger and immediate MERCOSUR 
environmental policies are hypocritical and are construed as an 
attempt to deny Southern Cone nations economic growth. This 
very real perspective also includes the possible imposition by 
Northern countries of non-tariff barriers on Latin American 
nations under the guise of environmental protection-a concern 
that would clearly challenge Article XX of the General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tariffs. 17 In addition to these moderate 
sensitivities, Heraldo Muiioz, Permanent Chilean Ambassador 
to the OAS, cites more "extreme positions" that· categorize the 
North as attempting "to conserve their natural beauties for the 
sake of developed countries' ecotourism. »l8 
Finally, the institutional and jurisdictional barriers to coor-
dinating environmental policy in MERCOSUR are formidable. 
Individually, member countries have very limited capacity for 
enforcing their own environmental laws. Additionally, federal-
state jurisdictional characteristics of member countries dis-
perse environmental legislation in a way that severely compli-
cates simple harmonization and enforcement of environmental 
15. Tussie & Vasquez. supra note 11. at 6. 
16. Green. supra note 7. at 184. 
17. Heraldo Munoz. The Environment in Inter·American Relations. In ENVI. 
RONMENT AND DIPLOMACY IN THE AMERICAS 8 (Heraldo Munoz ed .• 1992). 
18. Id. at 6. 
9
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codes. According to the Argentine Constitution, for example, 
environmental protection is the domain of provincial govern-
ments. Argentine environmental laws, like those of other 
MERCOSUR member countries, are ambiguous, often overlap, 
and are inadequately enforced. The starting point for MER-
COSUR environmental law is nothing less than a decentralized 
tangle of environmental codes and regulations. 
For whatever reason, the institutional and administrative 
ramifications of MERCOSUR's environmental shortcomings 
are alarming, particularly in light of growing transnational 
environmental problems arising from infrastructure integra-
tion projects and from shifting investment patterns within 
member country industries. 
III. CURRENT SOUTHERN CONE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGES 
Free trade among MERCOSUR members has brought some 
market-oriented improvements in environmental quality. Ar-
gentine paper and petrochemical industries have successfully 
incorporated cleaner technologies into many of their export op-
erations. 19 Uruguayan and Argentine hide and Brazilian shoe 
and steel production, however, exhibit a "dual production pat-
tern," where new plants utilize cleaner technologies for boom-
ing export markets while older plants maintain "dirty" produc-
tion for the domestic market.20 On balance, economic integra-
tion has produced more challenges to environmental quality in 
the Southern Cone than environmental policy development 
within the MERCOSUR has been willing or capable of ad-
dressing. 
Among MERCOSUR initiatives to promote trade are large 
land, sea and river route integration projects which produce 
entirely new sets of environmental and developmental consid-
19. See N. Birdsall & D. Wheeler, Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin 
America: Where are the Pollution Havens? 2 J. ENV'T & DEY. 1 (Winter 1993); D. 
Chudnovsky et al., Los Limites de La Apertura: Liberalizacion, reestructuracion produc· 
tiva y medio ambiente, ALIANZA, 1996, Editorial. 
20. Tussie & Vasquez, supra note 11, at 16. 
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erations for member countries. For example, the proposed 
2,130-mile river highway-the Hidrovia stretching from Nueva 
Palmira, Uruguay to Caceres, Brazil-has dire and immediate 
implications for the Pantanal, the world's largest wetlands. 21 
The project, scheduled to begin construction in 1997, would join 
the Parana and Paraguay rivers in an effort to integrate local 
river economies in all member countries and Bolivia. The proj-
ect would require a massive diversion of water from the Pan-
tanal into the waterway, thus disrupting the ecology of an area 
that is home to 650 species of birds, 240 fish species, 80 differ-
ent mammals, 50 reptile species, and 90,000 plant varieties.22 
Increased trade in mining, timber, and agricultural exports 
transported via the Hidrovia will produce additional indirect 
effects in the form of hazardous wastes,· fertilizer and pesticide 
run-off, increased water demand, deforestation and desertifica-
tion. Uruguayan rice production, 90 percent of which is ex-
ported (65 percent to Brazil), is likely to increase in the coming 
years, requiring more water from Uruguay's eastern marshes 
and, therefore, endangering that area's swamp ecology.23 In-
creased Brazilian soybean exports transiting along the water 
highway will require greater biocide use and land clearing, 
while, if unmitigated, depleting groundwater levels and raising 
nitrate water concentrations to levels dangerous for human 
consumption.24 The Hidrovia would also place the second-
largest deposit of iron and manganese in Corumba, Brazil 
within reach of mining exploitation. 25 
Interestingly, the approval of the mining project, fmanced 
by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
also raises concerns over multilateral fmancial institutions' 
21. See Todd Lewan, South American Waterway Plan Spark Economy vs. Ecology 
Debate; Environment: Planned 2,130 mile Link from Uruguay to Brazil will Bring 
Prosperity, Backers Claim. Foes Fear Effect on World's Largest Wetlands, Los ANGELES 
TIMES, December 31, 1995, at A13. 
22. See id. 
23. Among the species affected by the Hidrovia project is the black-necked swan, 
which is in danger of extinction. See Yvette Collymore, Trade-Environment: Trade 
Accords Undermining the Environment, InterPress Service, October 18, 1996. 
24. See Friends of the Earth, Why Hidrovia? (visited April 5, 1999) 
<http://WWW.foe.co.ukIfoeiltesllink13b.htm>. 
25. See Lewan, supra note 21. 
11
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environmental assessment procedures. In 1996, an independ-
ent Specialist Review Panel declared the waterway's environ-
mental impact statement inadequate for failing to produce suf-
ficient evidence supporting the contention that the Hidrovia 
would levy negligible environmental effects on the area. 26 
Developments in the MERCOSUR oil and natural gas mar-
ket may also have significant environmental outcomes for the 
Southern Cone. All four MERCOSUR countries have under-
gone the deregulation and privatization of their petroleum and 
energy sectors. Greater demand for hydrocarbonS generated by 
a larger MERCOSUR market may result in increased offshore 
wells. 27 
A proposed bridge over the River Plate and a proposed 
motorway linking Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo are among am-
bitious plans to link railways and waterways to natural re-
sources and agricultural production in Bolivia and Brazil. 28 
Ground infrastructure integration hopes to introduce addi-
tional Amazonian gold and timber resources, western Brazil's 
agricultural goods, and Bolivian gas deposits to export markets 
and foreign investors.29 With the encroachment of roads-
stretching from Guyana through Brazil to Chile, Bolivia, and 
Peru-indigenous and environmental groups fear rampant de-
forestation of remaining Amazonian forests and irreversible 
loss of species biodiversity in response to international com-
modity demand.30 
As in the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, transboundary 
pollution emanating from pre-existing and untreated sources 
remains a primary issue. The Brazilian Candiota thermoelec-
tric plant located in Rio Grande do Sul has been a point of con-
26. See Tussie & Vasquez, supra note 11, at 12. 
27. See Luis Castelli & Juan Rodrigo Walsh, Environmental Concerns Arising 
{rom Natural Resource Exploitation in the South Atlantic: Regional and Patagonian 
Implications, in 5 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: LATIN AMERICA (1996). 
28. See Collymore, supra note 23. 
29. See Pratap Chatterjee, Environment-Amazon: Infrastructure Plans Threaten 
Amazonia, InterPress Service, June 25, 1997. 
30. For additional information, see the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) website 
at <www.ran.org>. 
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tention with its neighbors in the bordering Uruguayan region 
of Cerro Largo.31 Acid rain generated by coal emissions makes 
its way across 80 kilometers into the agricultural region sur-
rounding the Uruguayan city of Cerro Grosso. 32 Brazilian offi-
cials plan to increase plant production, while the Uruguayan 
government's allegations of public health deterioration and 
damage to crops in Cerro Grosso have remained unanswered. 
The ordeal has escalated and captured the attention of Uru-
guayan politicians who have no MERCOSUR dispute resolu-
tion forum through which to voice their grievances. Humberto 
Pico, Uruguayan Deputy Minister of Housing and the Envi-
ronment, laments Brazil's "toxic aggression" and "wishes for 
binational cooperation that never happens."33 As he plainly 
puts it: 
Brazil's promises to solve the problem have not been ful-
filled. And the issue now goes above and beyond the as-
pects of health and environmental pollution, in light of 
the MERCOSUR's (Southern Cone Common Market) 
process of regional integration. 34 
The MERCOSUR simply lacks institutions for redressing 
the Deputy Minister's concerns. 
This lack of environmental capacity within the MERCOSUR 
also extends to its associate members. In a particularly acute 
demonstration of border environmental challenges to the 
Southern Cone region, the recent spill of 235,000 tons of toxic 
waste into Bolivia's Yana Machi River threatens the sur-
rounding ecology as well as ecosystems of the Pilcomayo River 
running through Paraguay and Argentina.35 The rupture of a 
dike at the Porco mine of the Compania Minera del Sur (Com-
sur), a property owned by the family of President Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada, occurred as the President prepared to host 
31. See Raul Ronzoni, Environment: Uruguay and Brazil at Loggerheads over Acid 
Rain, InterPress Service, August 28, 1996. 
32. See id. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. 
35. See Juan Carlos Rocha, Bolivia-Environment: Mine Spill has President in an 
Awkward Position,lnterPress Service, October 23. 1996. 
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the Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development in 
December of 1996. According to the Environmental Defense 
League of Bolivia (Lidema) and the Swiss Agency for Develop-
ment and Cooperation, this discharge of arsenic, cyanide, and 
other chemicals used in mining exploration into the Yana Ma-
chi and the Pilcomayo compounds daily river emissions of toxic 
substances-emissions whose regulation is impeded by limited 
public resources and the lack of hazardous waste disclosure 
requirements. 36 
IV. MERCOSUR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
The institutional framework of the MERCOSUR is set forth 
by the Las Lefias Agreement of 1992 and fmalized by the Pro-
tocol of Ouro Preto, ratified on December 17, 1994. The Com-
mon Market Council is the supreme decision-making body of 
the MERCOSUR. The Council is supported by an Administra-
tive Secretariat and the resolutions of the Common Market 
Group (CMG), directives from the Commerce Commission, rec-
ommendations from the Joint Parliament and the Counsel of 
the Economic and Social Forum.37 As MERCOSUR's executive 
body, the CMG is, in turn, supported by its Special Working 
Groups that are tasked to develop policy in areas deemed vital 
to the success of MERCOSUR. 
The momentum of environmental policy within the MER-
COSUR has been slow in developing. In preparation of the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment held in Rio de Janeiro, the presidents of the MERCO-
SUR nations issued the Canela Declaration. The Declaration 
built upon the cautious commitment to environmental quality 
of the Asunci6n Treaty and acknowledged "protection of the 
atmosphere, biodiversity, hazardous wastes, land degradation, 
forests, water resources, financial resources, international 
36. Id. 
37. See Carmen Longa Virasoro, EnvironTTumtal Aspects of Regional Integration, in 
MERCOSUR, in REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw: LATIN AMERICA, supra note 27. 
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trade, marine environment, and the strengthening of institu-
tions to achieve sustainable development."38 
That same year the CMG proposed the REMA at Las Leiias 
as a political means of addressing environmental policy. 
Resolution #22/92, approved at the sixth meeting, initiated five 
rounds of REMA meetings to produce a gradual strategy for 
dealing with environmental issues.39 Held in Montevideo in 
late November of 1993, REMA I stated the group's purpose: 
The REMA, considering the principles of graduality, 
flexibility and equilibrium dermed in the Asuncion 
Treaty, the principles emanating from the "Declaraci6n 
de Canela" and the [1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development] and the necessity to 
promote sustainable development, has as its objective 
the formulation of recommendations to the [Common 
Market Group] that will secure an adequate protection 
of the environment .... 40 
Additionally, REMA I enumerated the functions of future 
REMA meetings: 
(1) to identify and forge agreement on general criteria 
for the treatment of the environment within the MER-
COSVR; 
(2) to formulate and propose basic environmental direc-
tives that will contribute to concerted action by member 
states; 
(3) to coordinate and orient the efforts of the Common 
Market Working Groups where they are pertinent to the 
environment; 
38. ld. at 13. 
39. See BlLA, supra note 3, vol. 12. 
40. ld. 
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(4) to identify and analyze international environmental 
agreements and propose ways of harmonizing these 
conventions within member states; 
(5) to promote the incorporation of environmental issues 
in international cooperative projects within the MER-
COSUR; 
(6) to analyze the individual environmental laws of 
member states with respect to environmental criteria of 
the REMA; 
(7) to identify and propose actions for the improvement 
of the environment which concord with the objectives of 
the MERCOSUR; 
(8) to promote educational, training, research, and in-
formational activities supporting the proper manage-
ment of the environment.41 
Until 1996, the REMA constituted the nucleus of MERCO-
SUR environmental policy.42 Initially, environmental policy did 
not rank among the policy areas meriting their own SWG. Pe-
ripheral environmental measures were discussed as sub-
themes of the more commercially focused SWGs. For example, 
in 1993 Article 3 of the CMG's Resolution 5 founded an envi-
ronmental commission as one of the seven commissions subor-
dinate to the SWG 7 on industrial policy and technology. 
Similar environmental initiatives were initiated under the 
technical standards, agricultural policy and energy policy sub-
groups. 43 
The REMA had serious shortcomings as a mechanism for 
addressing environmental outcomes of economic integration. 
Foremost, the REMA did not operate as a formal institution 
41. REMAII was held in Buenos Aires in early April, 1994; REMA III was held in 
Brasilia in June, 1994; REMA IV was held in Asuncion in November, 1994. See BILA, 
supra note 3, vols. 13, 14, 15, respectively. 
42. For documentation of REMA meetings, see the BlLA, supra note 3, vols. 14-
18. 
43. Longa Virasoro, supra note 37. 
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capable of monitoring and regulating environmental conditions 
or of resolving environmental disputes. The REMA limited its 
initiatives to cataloging separate national environmental codes, 
surveying and tracking international environmental agree-
ments, and crafting a gradual plan for the harmonization of 
member country environmental laws. Member countries par-
ticipated in meetings by submitting reports on the individual 
state of the environment, on institutional changes within rele-
vant regulatory apparati, and on changes to their respective 
environmental laws!4 Indeed, this represented an informa-
tional gesture that kept environmental regimes compartmen-
talized along boundaries of national sovereignty. Proceedings 
from the REMA are littered with national briefmgs on the state 
of the environment in individual countries. Skillfully avoided 
were (1) discussions of transnational efforts to manage envi-
ronmental and economic processes, and (2) the active involve-
ment ofNGOs.45 
Moreover, REMA depended upon sub-units of the SWGs to 
draft environmental initiatives as addenda to working groups' 
main tasks. It fulfilled mostly an advisory role with respect to 
the SWGs. Channeled through branches of the SWGs, har-
monization of environmental codes meant harmonizing only 
select, trade relevant regulations, i.e. phytosanitary codes. 
Natural resource management and environmental protection 
were, essentially selected out of the SWG design. 
In 1994, the REMA did produce, however, a list of eleven 
Basic Directives for MERCOSUR environmental policy. It has 
been argued those directives were "supposed to be the back-
bone of a joint environmental strategy, but [were] far from con-
stituting an environmental agenda per se. "46 
The REMA provided a modicum of innocuous political con-
vergence on environmental issues that remained balkanized 
nationally and within the policy domain of weak, national envi-
ronmental regulation. Comparatively, it did not approach the 
44. BILA, supra note 3, vols.12-15. 
45. [d. vols.13, 14, 15. 
46. Tussie & Vasquez, supra note 11, at 14. 
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intent or the sophistication of the NAFTA enviromnental re-
gime. 
In 1996, the Taranco Declaration officially transformed the 
REMA into a Special Working Group on Environment en par 
with SWGs on mining, communications, fmance, industry, 
overland and maritime transportation, agriculture, energy and 
labor relations. Taranco sought to elevate the visibility of 
REMA's work and to expedite a plan for the harmonization of 
environmental regulations and production and process methods 
by the close of 1996. In April of 1997, CMG Resolution #20 best 
summarizes the progress of the Environment SWG. 
In that resolution, the delegations demonstrated their con-
cern over the delay in the work of SWG No.6 on the Environ-
ment generated by the absence of all the delegations in the last 
two ordinary meetings. The CMG reiterated the necessity that 
all the delegations participate in the meetings for the prompt 
completion of the legal environmental mechanisms for the 
MERCOSUR, through which it will construct the point of ref-
erence that will orient MERCOSUR environmental policy and 
the process of harmonization of environmental law among the 
Member Countries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
[I)n the articles of the [Asunci6n1 Treaty there does not 
exist any norm on the harmonization of nationallegisla-
tions related to the protection of the environment or on 
the establishment of a common policy in this area, there 
is no doubt that in the near future actions shall be nec-
essary in either of the two areas.47 
The Special Working Group on Environment has not prom-
ised a departure from the previous role of the REMA and a 
movement toward a more ambitious MERCOSUR environ-
47. Olivar Jimenez. Brazilian Association of Integration Studies. quoted in 
MARTHA LUCIA OLIVAR JIMENEZ. 0 ESTABELECIMENTO DE UMA POLITICA COMUN DE 
PROTECAO DO MEIO AMBIENTE-SUA NECESSIDADE NUM MERCADO COMUM 14 (1994). 
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mental policy. There are, however, a few functions that it 
could recommend, given the environmental challenges to 
MERCOSUR integration discussed earlier. 
The Uruguayan complaint of transboundary pollution at 
Cerro Grosso indicates a need for environmental dispute reso-
lution as conducted under NAFTA's CEC. Other functions of a 
CEC-like institution are appropriate to the MERCOSUR con-
text, i.e. studying and tracking the potential environmental 
effects of new and expanding trade and investment patterns. It 
could recommend support for MERCOSUR directives and/or 
individual federal legislation supporting ecosystem conserva-
tion, technology transfer, pollution prevention, environmental 
law enforcement, public participation and environmental as-
sessment compliance. A plan for federal legislation in each of 
the MERCOSUR countries designed to rationalize, consolidate, 
and enforce national environmental codes could coordinate an 
effective environmental regime while steering clear of sover-
eignty concerns. Recommending a facility designed to dissemi-
nate information on environmental matters and empowered by 
approval and enforcement of disclosure laws would corroborate 
progress in inter-American democratization and affIrm com-
mitments to sustainable development beyond rhetoric. MER-
COSUR border institutions could take the form of a Hidrovia 
environmental quality organization, charged with regulating 
emissions into the waterway and monitoring other likely envi-
ronmental effects on the river. 
It is likely that MERCOSUR SWG on Environment will con-. 
tinue its slow and casual approach to trade and the environ-
ment. This lack of depth in MERCOSUR environmental policy 
poses a formidable barrier to NAFTA-MERCOSUR integration 
and a FTAA. The weakness of the SWG and the lack ofinstitu-
tions dedicated to environmental quality and resource man-
agement underscore a continued reluctance to deal effectively 
with the environment. They forebode of future potential limi-
tations to economic integration. Environmental constituencies 
in other trading regions may prove hesitant to compromise 
their regulatory regimes with those of an environmentally defi-
cient trading bloc. Given NAFI'A's commitment to upward 
harmonization of environmental laws with trade partners, 
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MERCOSUR policies would have "to green" substantially, lest 
the organization become mired in accusations from North 
American environmentalists and exporters (sensitive to com-
petitive advantages) of lax Southern Cone envil"Onmental 
regulation. Essentially, MERCOSUR economic integration has 
left environmental policy far behind. The end result may be a 
trade pact that is incompatible with the structure, theory and 
level of commitment of NAFTA integration. 
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